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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
NATRONE WARD SEARS,
Plaintiff,
Case No. 14669
vs.
DWAIN THOMAS SOUTHWORTH,
Defendant/Third
Party Plaintiff
and Appellant,
vs.
THE STATE OF UTAH,
DEPARTMENT OF HIGHWAYS,
Third Party
Defendant and
Respondent.
BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from an adverse decision by the lower
Court where the lower Court granted third party defendant and
respondent's Motion to Dismiss, same having been filed on the
24th day of February, 1976, and having been decided by the
Honorable Ronald 0. Hyde, District Court Judge of the District
Court of Weber County, State of Utah, same having been decided
by Memorandum Decision on the 21st day of May, 1976, and by Order
Dismissing Third Party Complaint of Dwain Thomas Southworth
against the State of Utah, Department of Highways, signed on
the 1st day of June, 1976. Third party plaintiff, Dwain Thomas
Southworth, and appellant herein, was party to a suit filed by
Natrone Ward Sears, plaintiff in lower Court, against the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

aforementioned third party plaintiff and appellant herein,
same having been filed by plaintiff in the lower Court on or
about the 8th day of November, 1974, against defendant and
third party plaintiff, appellant herein, seeking recovery for
personal injuries suffered by her resulting from a motor
vehicle accident.

Subsequent to the filing of the original

Complaint herein by plaintiff in the lower Court, third party
plaintiff and appellant herein, did file his Amended Third
Party Complaint against the State of Utah, Department of
Highways, third party defendant and respondent herein,
claiming negligence on the part of the State of Utah,
Department of Highways, and seeking recovery for personal
injuries suffered by him as a result of the motor vehicle
accident herein.

Prior to trial on the merits, third party

defendant-respondent did file their Motion to Dismiss the
Second Cause of Action of third party plaintiff-appellant's
Amended Third Party Complaint on the ground .that appellant
failed to comply with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act
regarding notice to the State of Utah.
The basis for their Motion to Dismiss, was that the
original accident herein occurred on the 10th day of May, 1973,
and that Notice of Claim by third party plaintiff-appellant
against the State of Utah.was not filed until the 5th day of
April, 1975.

i

On or about the 24th day of February, 1976, third party
defendant-respondent did file their Motion to Dismiss third
party plaintiff-appellant's action herein, and supported same
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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with a Memorandum of Points and Authorities.

On or about the

26th day of March, 1976, third party plaintiff-appellant did
respond by filing his Memorandum of Points and Authorities in
opposition to third party defendant's Motion to Dismiss.

Third

party defendant-respondent then filed their Reply Memorandum
and both parties allowed the lower Court to decide the questions
submitted pursuant to Rule 2.8, Rules of Practice of the District
Courts of the State of Utah without further oral argument.
Third party defendant-respondent's Motion to Dismiss was
granted by the lower Court on the 21st day of May, 1976, and
this appeal is based on that decision,
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
Third party defendant-respondent's Motion to Dismiss third
party plaintiff-appellant's action brought against it was granted
by the lower Court based upon the fact that Notice of Claim
against the State of Utah was filed over one year from the
date that the accident complained of occurred claiming that the
State of Utah did not receive sufficient and adequate notice
within the one year provision as set forth in the Governmental
Immunity Aet, Utah Code Annotated, Chapter 30, Section 63 thereof.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the lower Court's granting of
third party defendant-respondent's Motion to Dismiss, and that
this Court issue an Order to the lower Court ordering it to
accept third party plaintiff-appellant's Amended Complaint
against third party defendant-respondent for the reason that
the Notice of Claim requirement as a prerequisite to maintaining
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

an action against the State of Utah for negligence does create
a special statute of limitations for Governmental Tort Feasors
and as such is violative of the equal protection guarantees of
the Constitution of the United States and of the Constitution
of the State of Utah.
That in the event this Honorable Court does not believe
that the Notice of Claim requirement creates a special statute
of limitations as hereinabove requested, that then in that event
this Honorable Court Order the lower Court to accept third party
plaintiff-appellant's Amended Complaint in that the Notice of
Claim requirement does not apply when a claim against the State
for negligence in the exercise of a proprietary function is
presented.

V

% >

That in the event neither of the above is granted by this
Honorable Court, that then in that event this Honorable Court
Order the lower Court to accept the Amended Complaint of third
party plaintiff-appellant to allow third party plaintiff-appellant
to present sufficient evidence to indicate that no knowledge of
the negligence of the State of Utah was discovered until the
time set for taking Depositions and not until approximately
March 7, 1975.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
This matter was commenced in the lower Court, by the filing
of a Complaint in the District Court of Weber County, State of
Utah, by plaintiff herein, Natrone Ward Sears, said Complaint
having been filed on or about the 11th day of November, 1974,
against defendant third party plaintiff and appellant herein,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Dwain Thomas Southworth, seeking recovery for injuries suffered
by the aforesaid plaintiff, as a result of an automobile collision
which occurred on Interstate 15 near Sunset, Davis County, Utah,
on or about the 10th day of May, 1973.
An Answer was filed by defendant, Dwain Thomas Southworth,
on or about the 2nd day of December, 1974. Thereupon, defendant
obtained the services of additional counsel, and on or about the
24th day of December, 1974, did file an Amended Answer and Counterclaim.

In said Counterclaim damages were sought for personal

injuries suffered as a result of the automobile accident which
occurred on or about the 10th day of May, 1973, as above referred
to.

On or about the 2nd day of January, 1975, original counsel

for defendant and then counterclaimant, Dwain Thomas Southworth,
filed a Notice of Claim against the State of Utah, Department of
Highways and to the Attorney General of the State of Utah, basically
seeking contribution from the State of Utah, Department of
Highways proportionate to its degree of negligence claimed in
said notice to be failure to adequately place warning signs or
other devices prior to the point where the inside lane of travel
on said highway had been obstructed by the placing of conical
warning signs blocking said lane of highway.

That thereupon,

on or about the 21st day of February, 1975, a Third Party
Complaint was filed by defendant and third party plaintiff,
appellant herein, against the State of Utah, Department of
Highways, primarily seeking payment by the State of Utah,
Department of Highways for any Judgment which plaintiff herein
would obtain for injuries and damages against defendant and
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third party plaintiff, .
Thereafter, on or about the 5th day of April, 1975, Dwain
Thomas Southworth did file his notice to the State of Utah
directing same to the Attorney General of the State of Utah
and to the State of Utah Road Commission, claiming damages
suffered by him as a result of the negligence of the State of
Utah, and the State of Utah Road Commission, in failure to
adequately provide warning of an obstruction which was present
on the road hereinabove referred to and claiming that said
failure to warn resulted in the accident herein.
Thereafter, defendant and third party plaintiff, appellant
herein, filed his Motion to Amend the Third Party Complaint
herein, same having been filed on the 29th day of December, 1975.
Said Motion to Amend Third Party Complaint was opposed by third
party defendant, respondent herein, and memoranda by both third
party plaintiff and third party defendant were filed supporting
their respective contentions.

Argument was had thereon before

the District Court of the Second Judicial District in and for
the County of Weber, State of Utah, the Honorable Judge Calvin
Gould presiding, on the 11th day of February, 1976, whereupon
the Court took the Motion to Amend his Third Party Complaint
under advisement.

A Memorandum Decision was rendered by the

Honorable Calvin Gould on the 17th day of February, 1976,
granting third party plaintiff's Motion to Amend Third Party
Complaint.

Thereafter, on or about the 20th day of February,

1976, defendant-third party plaintiff-appellant filed his Amended
Third Party Complaint against third party defendant-respondent.
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Third party defendant-respondent filed its Motion to Dismiss on
or about the 24th day of February, 1976, with supporting Memorandum
of Points and Authorities thereon.

Defendant third party plaintiff

and appellant herein filed his Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in opposition to third party defendant's Motion to Dismiss on
or about the 26th day of March, 1976, whereupon a Reply Memorandum
was filed by third party defendant and respondent herein on or
about the 30th day of March, 1976.

Lower Court, the Honorable

Judge Ronald 0. Hyde granted third party defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, finding the case of Gallegos v. Midvale City, 27 Utah 2nd
27, 492 P 2nd 1335 (1972) as controlling of the question.

Defendant,

third party plaintiff-appellant filed his Notice of Appeal on the
28th day of June, 1976, said Appeal being filed before this Honorable
Court on the 10th day of August, 1976.
Appellant herein intends to rely primarily on the record
before this Court and on the extensive memoranda submitted by
both sides in the lower Court.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC HIGHWAYS IS A PROPRIETARY

OF
FUNCTION OF GOVERNMENT AND IS NOT WITHIN SCOPE <

THE DOCTRINE OF I SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY. THEREFORE,
LIABILITY OF THE STATE EXISTS OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF

THE GOVERNMENTAL IMMUNITY ACT AND THE NOTICE
REQUIREMENTS THEREIN ARE INAPPLICABLE.
The Court is referred to the Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in opposition to third party defendant's Motion to
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Dismiss which was filed with the lower Court by defendant and
third party plaintiff, appellant herein.
The State herein undertook a proprietary function by its
undertaking the maintenance of public highways herein and the
painting thereof.

At the time that the accident complained of

in this action occurred, the State of Utah was in the process
of painting lines upon the highway in the vicinity of the
accident site, and in doing so failed to take adequate
precautionary measures to insure that an accident of this
nature would not occur.

Idaho, our neighboring State, in a 19

decision, held that the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity was
inapplicable where a unit of government
function.

acts in a proprietary

The Idaho Supreme Court further held that the

construction and maintenance of highways is a proprietary
function, which is the case before the Bar here.

See Smith v.

State, 93 Idaho 795, 473 P 2nd 937 (1970).
It is contended by appellant herein that the rationale
followed in Smith should be followed by this Honorable Court
where the Court stated at 473 P 2nd 937, page 946 thereof, as
follows:

"We therefore hold that the Highway
Department is subject to liability
for harm caused to persons lawfully
using the highways for the purposes
intended when the State Highway
Department creates or maintains a
dangerous condition on the highway
if the State Highway Department:
(1) Knows of or by the exercise of
reasonable care would discover such
condition, (2) should realize that
the condition involved an unreasonable
risk of harm to those using the highways,
and (3) should expect that persons using
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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the highway will not discover or
realize the danger, and (4) fails
to exercise reasonable care to make
the condition safe or to adequately
warn of the condition and the risk
involved, and (5) the persons using
the highways do not know or have
reason to know of the condition and
attendant risks.ft
cf# , 2 Restatement
of Torts, Sections 342, 343, and 343A.
Along the same lines the Court has referred to Prosser, Law
of Torts, 3rd Ed. Chapter 27, Section 125.
POINT II.
THE RIGHT TO BRING AN ACTION FOR DAMAGES AGAINST
A TORT FEASOR IS A RIGHT VESTED IN THE VICTIM AND
CANNOT BE DENIED NOR ENCUMBERED BY THE STATE
ABSENT A REASONABLE BASIS FOR THAT ACTION.
THEREFORE, THAT PART OF THE UTAH GOVERNMENTAL
IMMUNITY ACT WHICH REQUIRES TIMELY NOTICE"PRIOR
TO THE FILING OF A CLAIM UNDER THE ACT IS VOID
AND OF NO EFFECT AS VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION GUARANTEES OF THE STATE AND FEDERAL
CONSTITUTIONS.
The lower Court in granting third party defendant's Motion
to Dismiss, primarily relied on the case of Gallegos v. Midvale
City, 27 Utah 2nd 27, 492 P 2d 1335 (1972).

Although that case

primarily dealt with the question whether or not a minor was
subject to the notice requirement pursuant to the Waiver of
Sovereign Immunity involving cities, the Honorable Justice
Ellett in his dissenting opinion starting at page 1338 of 492
P 2nd presented a far more convincing argument recognizing the
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problem with the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution
of the United States and the Constitution of the State of Utah.
There is no question, that the Governmental Immunity Act
requiring notice to the government of injuries sustained as a
result of the negligence of governmental agencies, sets up four
separate types of classes, those being governmental tort feasors,
private tort feasors, victims of governmental tort feasors, and
victims of private tort feasors.

For an extensive review and

discussion of the background.and problems inherent in the notice
requirement provisions in Waivers of Governmental Immunity Acts,
see 60 Cornell Law Review 417, a copy of which was attached to
third party plaintiff and appellant's Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in opposition to third party defendant's Motion to
Dismiss, submitted to the lower Court herein.
There is no question that the traditional policies that the
King can do no wrong have been changed, and realistically should
have been changed.

In American society, government does not

emanate from a superior being, but rather emanates directly from
the people, and as such, government is nothing more than a body
of the people.

As such, the old adage of the King can do no

wrong is an outmoded and outdated concept, which was recognized
by the Legislature of the State of Utah when they passed into
law Chapter 30, Section 63 of the Utah Code Annotated, generally
referred to as the Utah Governmental Immunity Act.

However, when

the Legislature required the various notice requirements, Section
63-30-12, Utah Code Annotated, it placed a severe burden upon
injured parties suffered as a result of governmental torts, and
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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placed the governmental entities in a much more favored class
than private tort feasors.
The Court's attention is drawn to the extensive arguments
set forth in third party plaintiff-appellant's Memorandum of
Points and Authorities in opposition to third party defendant's
Motion to Dismiss, having been submitted to lower Court, and
appellant herein is not going to reiterate the arguments contained
therein, however, is going to rely upon the extensive law presented
heretofore and which has been made a part of the record herein.
The Court is further referred to the article contained in
1975 Utah Law Review 1027, and starting at page 1043 thereof.
POINT III.
THE STATE OF UTAH DID RECEIVE ADEQUATE NOTICE OF
THE ACCIDENT INVOLVED, AND WERE AWARE OR SHOULD
HAVE BEEN AWARE OF THE NEGLIGENCE INVOLVED.
Even if we accept the State1s contention that no notice was
provided to it pursuant to the Governmental Immunity Act, there
is no way that the State can deny that they were aware of the
accident herein, since the accident herein was investigated by
its law enforcement officers and a written investigating officer's
report of traffic accident was filed with the State as required.
Said report was filed on or about the 25th day of May, 1973,
bearing number 46489.

The State of Utah, by and through its

agents, were aware or should have been aware of the painting
operation which had occurred, in that the report specifically
set forth the driver of vehicle number two was slowing down for
State Road paint crews on 1-15.

The lane was marked with rubber
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cones.

Some cones were placed diagonally across the inside

traffic lane....

It is further interesting to note that the

official report filed by the investigating officer and his
field note report indicate a different location of the warning
sign warning of the painting which was being conducted.

The

field note report indicating that the warning sign was placed
behind the conical warning markers, and the official report
filed with the State indicating that the warning sign was
placed somewhat ahead of the conical warning markers.
At any rate, if this Honorable Court finds that the one
year notice requirement set forth in the Governmental Immunity
Act is valid, then appellant should still be allowed to proceed
on the basis of the dissent by the Honorable Justice Maughan
in the case of Scarborough v. Granite School District, 531 P 2d
480, (1975), in that the notice requirement and the justifications
for said requirement were satisfied by the filing of an accident
report filed by the investigating officer of said accident.
Further, the one year notice requirement if same is found to be
constitutional and valid, should not begin to run until discovery
of the negligence of the State of Utah was made, which said
discovery of negligence was not made until approximately the
7th day of March, 1975.
CONCLUSIONS
The painting of a highway by the State of Utah was a
proprietary function of government, and as such, is not within
the scope of the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, and as such,
does not require that the notice provision of the Governmental
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Immunity Act be complied with.
The requirement of the giving of a notice prioi

«o a filing

of suit, and said notice being shorter than the statute of
limitations for tortious conduct of private tort feasors, creates
special legislation in favoir of governmental entities, and
creates four separate classes of individuals affected by tortious
conduct, with governmental entities being given preferred status,
and as si ich, is a violation of the equal protection clauses of
the Constitution of the State of Utah as well -s tic Constitution
of the United States of America.

As such, thr-

-.a, ;( c. .-. qiilrement

of the Governmental Immunity Act should be declared as invalid
and unconstitutional and of no force and effect.
The fae 1. Mia I a w i :I t ten investigating officer f s report o i."
traffic accident was filed with the State of Utah shoiild have
given the State of Utah adequate and sufficient notice of the
possible action or claim against :i t where the report refers to
the actions of the State Road paint crew and indicates that the
site of the accident was at the same place where the

c

« a( c Rc-d

paint crew placed conical warning markers across one lane <)f
traffic.

As such, if the notice requirement provision is upheld

by thi s Honorab 1 e Court, th 1 s Coi n :t shon] d f :i nd that i 101ice was
given to the State of Utah, and that the underlying theories for
the giving of notice was substantially complied with.
Further, this Court should rule

Lht-L

L:JG running of the one

year notice requirement does not take effect until such time
that an injured party discovers the negligence of the governmental
entity involved.
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Respectfully submitted this 8th day of October, 1976.
lAVAS & LEMA

)avid B. Havas
Attorneys for Third Party
Plaintiff Appellant
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
Mailed a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing
Appeal to attorney for third party defendant and respondent,
Kim R. Wilson, Seventh Floor Continental Bank Building, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84101, postage prepaid, on this 8th day of
October, 1976.

(L'^^j^^yLuoLf
LINDA MOORE, Secretary
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